International Law’s Rule of Five: Russia, Ukraine, and the Dark Side of Polycentrism by Waters, Timothy William
  Navigation 
TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS —  6 June, 2014 
Print  0    
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
International Law’s Rule 
of Five: Russia, Ukraine, 
and the Dark Side of 
Polycentrism
In my previous post, I looked at the obvious illegality of 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine – and the problems with that 
obviousness in the pluralistic cacophony of international law. 
In this post, I look at who’s to blame, and what’s to be done: 
more work for diplomats, less for lawyers.
I. Bush’s Breakfast: Sow and Reap

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In domestic law, we have mechanisms for final decision. The 
storied US Supreme Court Justice William Brennan used to 
ask his clerks what the most important rule in constitutional 
law was; then he’d hold up five fingers. On a nine-justice 
court, five votes make anything possible; without them, 
nothing can be done. International law has its own Rule of 
Five: If you wield a Security Council veto, whatever you do is 
almost never illegal.
There is, in other words, a certain slack latitude in 
international law, even in our non-aggression norm – an 
inclarity that is, in part, a consequence of other states’ 
actions. For it is a rule that other powers, most especially 
America, have taken advantage of, in ways that only 
reconfirmed the non-aggression norm’s shaky character. 
Consider Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent comment on 
the Ukrainian crisis, uttered without irony: “You just don’t in 
the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading 
another country on a completely trumped up pretext”. But 
there’s no need to go back two centuries, or even one: Kerry, 
you’ll recall, voted for the Iraq war before he voted against it.
And as for that last century, it had its share of self-defined 
interventions, conducted with aplomb in the face of general 
outrage: The invasion of Grenada, for example: The UN 
General Assembly condemned that, 108 to 9; President 
Reagan said it “didn’t upset my breakfast at all.” Bush’s 
breakfast – and determination – were not disturbed by 
claims of illegality in Iraq either. Nor has it only been 
Republicans: In 1999, President Clinton and much of Europe 
bombed Serbia without UN authorization. And just last fall, 
President Obama boasted, accurately enough, that America 
got Syria to abandon chemical weapons by threatening force 
– something that, under the UN Charter, is equivalent to 
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actually using force. (That time, of course, Russia helped 
broker the deal.)
Since the ink on the UN Charter started drying, the norm of 
non-aggression has been under serious conceptual and 
practical strain, which has only gotten worse, or at least 
more obvious, in recent decades. So while doctrinally there 
are good reasons to think the Kosovo intervention’s 
legitimate illegality was no precedent for Crimea, as a matter 
of socio-politics it’s obvious that recent actions by the West 
have widened the conceptual chasm in the global 
intervention norm.
Western complaints aren’t double-standards: they are a 
failure to recognize that we have been resetting the 
standard: The doctrinal claims of R2P, the interventions in 
Kosovo and especially Iraq – done without Security Council 
approval – have made it more plausible to take unilateral 
aggressive action and make implausible claims with a 
straight face. It’s the dark side of polycentrism and law-as-
conversation. The Russians have noticed that it’s a Rule of 
Five, not One, as they proved by vetoing a Security Council 
resolution that would have declared the Crimean 
referendum illegal. (Some will recall that, during the Kosovo 
crisis, a Russian-sponsored resolution to condemn NATO’s 
action was defeated in the Council – which was seen by 
some as indirect authorization; I’ve not heard anyone 
making that argument about the failed resolution on 
Ukraine.) Indeed, great-power interventions – whether 
pretextual or simply on one’s own authority – happen quite 
often, and the most realistic legal response is: Yes they do.
II. Five Can Play That Game. . .
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Given law’s indeterminacy, what’s a lawyer like Obama to 
do? Quite understandably, the US and its European allies 
have recognized the liberating possibilities for policy: 
They’ve got seats on the Security Council too, and the same 
structures of international law’s anarchic polycentrism 
prevent Russia from controlling the legal discourse – no 
decision means, equally, no decision about Western 
countermoves either. So there’s little Russia can do to 
prevent what it has condemned as Cold War tactics of a 
“bygone era”: denunciations, moves towards diplomatic 
isolation, and lashings of sanctions.
Little Russia could do, that is, even if those sanctions were 
themselves illegal. I don’t think that’s the case here, though 
that – much like Russia’s invasions – is a contingent fact 
which shouldn’t distract us from the fundamentally, 
irreducibly discretionary nature of the decision to apply 
sanctions. There are other cases – such as, say, the sanctions 
regime against Iran – whose legality is much more dubious, 
but that is no obstacle to their implementation. (In that case, 
their formal pedigree via the Security Council is impeccable, 
but the rationale is almost Crimean in its willfulness.)
All to say that Russia’s implausible deniability is no obstacle 
to a robust Western response – but that is, and should be, 
little solace to those who want to see a legal regime to 
regulate the use of force or the more existential questions of 
international life. What we have is polycentric, anarchic 
politics, claims and counter-claims – diplomacy and 
conversation. If you like, you can call it law.
• In my next post, I’ll look at the problems with the Western legal 
and political response to the Crimean referendum and the 
question of eastern Ukraine’s contested future: legal lessons for 
diplomats.
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